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The Department of Defense relied heavily on commercial transportation for both
unit deployment and ammunition sustainment during Desert Shield/Desert Storm. Nearly
70 percent of all ammunition was carried by commercial truck companies.
The Mobility Requirements Study (MRS) and Mobility Requirements Study
Bottom Up Review Update (MRS BURU) identified transportation requirements for
mobilization in response to a Major Regional Contingency (MRC). There are many
issues and concerns within both industry and DoD that can be identified as factors
affecting readiness, such as declining numbers and sizes of railcars and insufficient
Container Handling Equipment at ammunition depots. These factors and others risk
DoD's ability to deploy ammunition rapidly in response to contingencies and conduct
efficient day-to-day operations. Many of these factors stem from the way DoD does
business, the changing industry environment, and inconsistent peacetime versus wartime
operational requirements.
This thesis analyzes factors affecting modal combination decisions as well as the
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This thesis analyzes current commercial transportation capabilities and applies
them to the Department of Defense's (DoD) requirements for moving conventional
ammunition from depot to port within the Continental United States (CONUS) during
peacetime and mobilization. Conventional ammunition is defined as "a device charged
with explosives, propellants, pyrotechnics, or initiating composition for use in connection
with defense or offense, including demolitions" [Ref. l:p. 6]. There are two general
ammunition categories. Conventional ammunition inventory is distinguished as being
either wholesale or retail. Wholesale inventory is all conventional ammunition stocks
between the point of production and the point of receipt at the first intermediate (retail)
Continental United States (CONUS) activity. Retail inventory is all conventional
ammunition stocks between the point of receipt at the first intermediate (retail) CONUS
activity and the point of consumption. [Ref. 2:p. 14-1-15]
The research will consider security, equipment capabilities, limitations,
availability, and industry trends for the movement of wholesale and retail conventional
ammunition by commercial rail and motor carriers. The objective of this thesis is to
determine the most efficient modal combination, as well as the current and future
viability for transporting arms, ammunition, and explosives for the DoD.
B. BACKGROUND
The DoD relied heavily on commercial transportation for both unit deployment
and ammunition sustainment during Desert Shield/Desert Storm. Approximately 16,000
commercial railcars and 54,000 commercial trucks were used to transport 1.2 million tons
of unit cargo to U.S. seaports. Nearly 70 percent of all ammunition was carried by
commercial truck companies. Overall, the commercial sector carried nearly 90 percent of
the tonnage transported by truck and rail to U.S. ports. [Ref. 3]
The Mobility Requirements Study (MRS) and Mobility Requirements Study
Bottom Up Review Update (MRS BURU) identified transportation requirements for
mobilization in response to a Major Regional Contingency (MRC). Currently DoD
ammunition is transported 90% by motor carrier (truck) and 10% by rail [Ref. 4]. DoD's
goal is to increasingly containerize its ammunition and change the transportation ratio to
90% rail and 10% truck [Ref. 5].
There are many issues and concerns within both industry and DoD that can be
identified as factors affecting readiness. These factors risk DoD's ability to deploy
ammunition rapidly in response to contingencies and conduct efficient day-to-day
operations. Many of these factors stem from the way DoD does business, the changing
industry environment, and inconsistent peacetime versus wartime operational
requirements. There has not been an independent assessment of current or projected
commercial transportation capabilities that would affect this policy shift.
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
1. Primary Research Question:
Given the current process of Department of Defense ammunition shipment in both
peacetime and/or mobilization, what is the most efficient modal method to transport
munitions?
2. Secondary Research Questions:
What is the current process for moving ammunition from depot to port?
What is the Department of Defense ammunition organization?
How does DoD acquire ammunition?
How is ammunition documented?
What is the Department of Defense's proposed ammunition delivery policy
shift?
What is the basis for the policy shift?
What security requirements exist for ammunition shipments?
What is breakbulk cargo?
What is containerized cargo?
What are commercial rails' capabilities in terms of security, equipment
limitations, equipment availability, and access?
What are commercial motor carriers' capabilities in terms of security,
equipment limitations, equipment availability, and access?
What types of containers are used for ammunition transportation?
What is the current ratio of truck to rail shipments?
How would transportation requirements for ammunition change during
mobilization for a MRC?
D. SCOPE OF THESIS
This thesis will focus on DoD certified munitions carriers to assess their current
and future capability to support ammunition shipment. To understand the current and
future shipment requirements, historical shipment data will be obtained for the
Department of Defense as a whole, and specifically from each of the Tier I and II Army
ammunition depots to the three DoD ammunition ports. Tier I and II Army ammunition
depots include: Anniston, Alabama; Bluegrass, Kentucky; Crane, Indiana; Hawthorne,
Nevada; Letterkenny, Pennsylvania; McAlester, Oklahoma; Red River, Texas; and
Tooele, Utah. Department of Defense ammunition ports include: Naval Weapons Station
Seal Beach, Detachment Port Hadlock, Washington; Naval Weapons Station Seal Beach,
Detachment Concord, California; and Military Ocean Terminal, Sunny Point, North
Carolina.
E. METHODOLOGY
To better understand ammunition transportation and the related requirements and
issues, this research first provides a general overview of the ammunition supply chain,
the organizations involved, and the requirements for transportation during peacetime and
mobilization. In order to accomplish this the following resources were utilized:
• Department of Defense Publications
• Books, Periodicals, Journals and electronic resources available at the Naval
Postgraduate School (NPS) Library
• Internet web-sites pertaining to the organizations involved in ammunition
management
Then, the equipment required for shipping ammunition is analyzed, emphasizing
the industry trends and potential impact on the ammunition supply chain. In addition to
the resources listed above, information was obtained from exercise lessons learned and
studies conducted by DoD agencies involved in ammunition management. Also,
government personnel with key roles in the ammunition transportation process were
interviewed. The commercial trucking companies who transport arms, ammunition, and
explosives were analyzed to gain insight into the ammunition shipping environment.
This was accomplished by surveying each company. These analyses provide
recommendations about DoD using commercial transportation assets to ship arms,
ammunition, and explosives.
F. ORGANIZATION
Chapter II describes the Department of Defense's ammunition supply chain. This
includes transportation asset requirements to support mobilization for a Major Regional
Contingency. It also provides an overview of exercises and wargames developed to test
the ability of DoD and the commercial transportation industry to respond to a MRC.
Chapter III presents the types of equipment utilized for ammunition shipment. It
also discusses transportation industry trends that have the potential of affecting future
equipment availability. The focus of the chapter is to identify important factors to
consider when making transportation mode decisions.
Chapter IV presents the results of a survey of trucking companies involved in
shipping ammunition. It describes the survey instrument and survey findings, and
discusses the issues affecting motor carriers.
Chapter V provides conclusions about mmunition transportation environment, as
well as recommendations for determining future modal decisions and potential areas of
further research.
G. BENEFITS OF STUDY
This research provides insight into the complexity of the changing ammunition
transportation industry. It will benefit personnel capable of making and changing
ammunition transportation policies by exposing trends within the industry that require
further attention. It will also benefit individuals making transportation mode decisions on
a day-to-day basis by showing how to apply modal characteristics to obtain transportation
assets with the best value to the government.
II. AMMUNITION SUPPLY CHAIN MANAGEMENT
The Department of Defense's management of conventional ammunition is a
complex system that contains unique characteristics and terminology. This chapter
consists of four sections. The first section explains DoD's ammunition management
organization. The second section identifies DoD authorized ammunition carriers and
presents the current controls and limitations to minimize theft opportunities and
maximize safety of ammunition during transportation within CONUS. It also introduces
the differences between break-bulk and containerized cargo, and its applicability to
ammunition transportation. The third section identifies munitions movement
requirements for peacetime and mobilization for a Major Regional Contingency (MRC).
The fourth section presents DoD exercises designed to test ordnance transportation
capabilities within the DoD and the commercial transportation industry.
A. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AMMUNITION MANAGEMENT
ORGANIZATION
Managing the vast quantities of conventional ammunition that DoD produces,
stores, and uses is a difficult and complex task. A central organization was created to
ease the management burden on each individual service. The core of the management
organization is the Single Manager for Conventional Ammunition (SMCA). Figure 2.1
shows the commands that are part of the SMCA organization and their relationships.













Hgure 2. 1 . DoD Ammunition Management Organization.
1. Secretary of the Army
In 1977, the Department of Defense issued DoD Directive 5160.65, which
designated the Army as the Single Manager for Conventional Ammunition (SMCA).
This initiative was intended to achieve economies of scale, prevent duplication of efforts
among the services, integrate logistics functions, and generally promote efficiency and
effectiveness [Ref. l:p. 2]. Specifically, the Secretary of the Army was assigned the
SMCA mission within the DoD with the power to redelegate, within the Army, the
necessary authorities to perform the SMCA mission. Authority to execute SMCA
operations was delegated to the Army Material Command. [Ref. 6:p. 1-1, 1-2]
2. U. S. Army Material Command
The Army Material Command (AMC), located in Alexandria, Virginia, is
responsible for acquiring the ammunition for all the U.S. Military services [Ref. 7:p. 13].
This is accomplished by the Industrial Operations Command (IOC), a subordinate
command of AMC.
3. U. S. Army Industrial Operations Command
The Army Industrial Operations Command (IOC), located in Rock Island, Illinois,
performs total, worldwide life cycle support of conventional ammunition. Industrial
Operations Command's facilities and highly skilled workforce can produce and test new
weapon and ammunition products, ship materiel, sustain equipment and support materiel
deployed worldwide. They maintain expertise in maintenance, logistics, manufacturing
and production. [Ref. 8]
4. SMCA Center
The Single Manager for Conventional Ammunition (SMCA) center, located in
IOC headquarters, is responsible for life cycle management of conventional ammunition.
It is the National Inventory Control Point (NICP) for munitions and coordinates
ammunition procurement for new weapon systems. The SMCA center manages
wholesale ammunition, coordinates the production base, and oversees the operations at
five arsenals, ten depots, and twenty-two ammunition plants.
Each service determines their own requirements for ammunition based on future
year budgets, war plans, and distribution plans. The SMCA center receives input from
the Commander-in-Chiefs (CINCs) and service component commanders to determine
amounts of ammunition to be procured and locations to which it will distributed for use
or storage. [Ref. 7:p. 50]
The SMCA acts as a wholesaler, providing each service with the desired
ammunition and storing it in bulk quantities until distribution to their retail activities.
SMCA also provides the storage facilities for wholesale stock. [Ref. 9:p. 21] It provides
retail management for the Army. The other services provide retail management through
the use of Inventory Control Point (ICP) managers. Although the SMCA center performs
wholesale management, each service operates wholesale information systems, which are
not linked to each other, to maintain visibility and inventory data on their assets. [Ref.
7:p. 50]
Service Inventory Control Point (ICP) Managers at the retail level receive
requisitions from their units for ammunition. If the service ICPs fill the requisition, a
source would be identified from their own retail or wholesale stocks. Each service issues
from their retail stocks before requesting ammunition from the wholesale level. For
ammunition controlled at the wholesale level, each service processes the requisition and
releases the ammunition for issue from a designated depot. [Ref. 7:pp. 58-59]
5. U. S. Army Ammunition Depots
After the end of the Cold War, the need for large stockpiles of conventional
munitions decreased. The 1993 Mobility Requirements Study (MRS) conducted by the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, recommended a smaller, safer, and better quality stockpile of
ammunition with a reduced workforce using fewer storage installations. [Ref. 10]
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During peacetime, ammunition is consumed primarily for training. A plan was
developed to reduce the cost of transporting training ammunition. The plan divided
CONUS into eastern, central and western regions for supplying ammunition. Except for
the eastern region, each region received one ammunition facility to reduce the cost of
transporting training ammunition during peacetime. The eastern region received two
facilities because more military bases were located in that region compared to other
regions.
The facilities were broken down into different types of "Tiers" based on their
function. A Tier I facility stores the first 30 days of war reserve ammunition and
ammunition for training. The war reserve ammunition is shipped from Tier I facilities
first during a war. Tier II facilities store war reserve ammunition to be used after the first
30 days; Tier HI facilities store excess ammunition. [Ref. 7:pp. 15-16] Figure 2.2 shows
the name and location of each Tier I and II depot.
6. Ammunition Ports
During peacetime or mobilization, all DoD ammunition is shipped through three
ammunition ports. The ammunition ports are located at Port Hadlock, Washington,
Concord, California, and Sunny Point, North Carolina. (See Figure 2.2)
The types of vessels these ports can handle depend on the ship's characteristics
and the port's infrastructure characteristics. Concord is unable to handle ships higher
than 135 feet and with drafts greater than 35 feet [Ref. 11]. Until recently Concord did
not have a dedicated container crane. Container throughput was affected by the lack of
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Figure 2.2. Ammunition Depots and Seaports.
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delivered to Concord in the spring of 1999 [Ref. 12]. At the Military Ocean Terminal,
Sunny Point (MOTSU) access to two of their wharves is limited to ships with drafts
under 38 feet. The draft limitation at their remaining wharf is significantly more
stringent due to heavy siltation. [Ref. 13] Port Hadlock is capable of handling deep draft
vessels but its infrastructure limits throughput. Port Hadlock does not have rail access to
the port. The nearest rail facility is a newly constructed intermodal transfer yard at
Bangor, Washington. From there, material must be trucked the remaining 40 miles to the
port. Also, Port Hadlock is scheduled to receive a new container gantry crane in May,
1999. This will increase container throughput and increase the types of vessels that can
be served there. [Ref. 12] Table 2.1 lists specific infrastructure characteristics for each
port.




Concord Pier 2-7 1 floating 1 superstacker, 9 locomotives,






Port Hadlock Pier 1 - 2.25 5 mobile cranes 39 forklifts, two 3 tractors, 10






MOTSU >50 terminal- 2 container Six RTCH 7 locomotives,




Table 2. . Ammunition Port Infrastructure Ch aracteristics [Ref. 11,12,13].
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a. Naval Weapons Station Seal Beach, Detachment Concord
Concord is located on the Suisan Bay of the Sacramento River in
California, about 39 nautical miles from the Golden Gate Bridge. Concord is the biggest
naval ordnance support operation in the nation. Ship access is limited by a rail bridge
crossing the channel. Bridge clearance is 135 feet, with ship draft limited to 35 feet and
width of 300 feet. [Ref. 11]
The Inland Area consists of administrative buildings and weapon storage
magazines. Concord's primary purpose is loading and unloading large quantities of
weapons and equipment from cargo and pre-positioned ships. [Ref. 12]
b. Naval Weapons Station Seal Beach, Detachment Port Hadlock
Port Hadlock is the only ordnance base on the Pacific Coast capable of
pierside loading of deep draft, high mast vessels such as aircraft carriers, large
amphibious ships, and replenishment ships. [Ref. 12]
c. Military Ocean Terminal, Sunny Point
Military Ocean Terminal, Sunny Point (MOTSU) is located five miles
north of Southport, North Carolina on the Cape Fear River. It provides worldwide
transshipment of DoD ammunition, explosives, and other dangerous cargo and
predominantly serves prepositioned ships. [Ref. 13]
B. AMMUNITION TRANSPORTATION
The Joint Chiefs of Staff stated in the Focused Logistics portion of Joint Vision
2010 that "outsourcing, privatization and competition offer the prospective of lowering
14
costs and improving performance across a wide range of activities..." [Ref. 14].
Department of Defense policy is to rely on the commercial transportation industry to the
extent feasible to meet military shipping requirements [Ref. 5:p. VI-3].
In the early to mid- 1 980' s, concern over the security of in-transit ammunition,
explosives and weapons, especially small missiles and other portable munitions, rose
with the tide of international terrorism. A Navy report issued in May, 1985 said "naval
ordnance shipments are vulnerable to threats of espionage, terrorism and carelessness."
"We have become too cavalier" about safeguarding sensitive shipments, the Head of the
Naval Sea Systems Command said in a memo several months earlier. An Army inspector
general's report in September, 1985 stated that "commercial transportation of
ammunition is extremely vulnerable to theft." [Ref. 15]
The discovery of serious flaws in the munitions transportation system stirred
concern inside the Pentagon because the particular weapons involved were so directly
applicable to terrorism and because shipments move across the country in such great
numbers. [Ref. 15]
Highly secret shipments of nuclear weapons use professionally trained guards and
drivers, as well as specially built government trucks equipped with elaborate
communications gear to keep track of the cargo. Such precautions are considered
prohibitively expensive for the 45,000-50,000 per year shipments of all types of
conventional military munitions. The Pentagon also feels compelled to use commercial
trucking firms because, one official said, the law prohibits government competition with
private-sector transportation [Ref. 15]. According to a Defense Department official,
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Pentagon procedures for shipping conventional munitions are deliberately intended to
"keep a low profile," apparently in the hope that such shipments will be virtually
indistinguishable from other civilian cargoes on the nation's highways. He stated, "It
would be counterproductive to have everything move in military convoys." [Ref. 15]
While the DoD continues to be dedicated to the use of commercial transportation, the
perceived poor security performance and high risk did instigate reassessing and
redefining security requirements for ammunition shipments.
Peculiarities associated with ammunition separate it from other commodities
managed by the Department of Defense. The most obvious is the inherent danger
associated with handling explosives. To assist the logistics community in storing,
shipping, and handling ammunition, specific items are divided into explosive classes,
which denote compatibility with other end items based on volatility and hazards of
progressive combustion. [Ref. 9:p. 12] Additionally, Net Explosive Weight (NEW)
limitations are placed on all facilities and ports that handle ammunition to minimize the
amount of damage caused by an explosion. The DoD bases its ammunition transportation
security requirements on the risk to others if it should be stolen. The ammunition
classifications that DoD currently uses are hazard classification, security risk categories
and codes, and Net Explosive Weight (NEW).
1. Hazard Classification
DoD's hazard classification system reflects the United Nations Organization's
(UNO) nine classes for dangerous goods. The nine classes are:
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• Class 1 for ammunition and explosives.
• Class 2 for gases, flammable or nonflammable.
• Class 3 for flammable liquids.
• Class 4 for flammable solids or substances, including spontaneous
combustible and flammable when wet.
• Class 5 for oxidizing substances.
• Class 6 for poisonous and infectious substances, liquids and solids (includes
ammunition which contain toxic chemical agents, and containers of toxic
chemical agents in bulk).
• Class 7 for radioactive substances.
• Class 8 for corrosives.
• Class 9 for miscellaneous dangerous substances. [Ref. 16:pp. 1-17— 1-18]
Within Hazard Class 1, ammunition and explosives are further broken down into
divisions, which indicate the hazard based on the "...character and predominance of
associated hazards and on the potential for causing personnel casualties or property









Non-mass detonating, projection hazard
Mass fire, minor blast or projection hazard
Moderate fire hazard, no blast
Very insensitive substances
Table 2.2. Hazard Class 1 (Ammunition & Explosives) [Ref. 17:pp. 1-17— 1-18].
2. Security Risk Categories and Codes
On the basis of their relative utility, attractiveness, and availability to criminal
elements, sensitive Arms, Ammunition, and Explosives (AA&E) are categorized
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according to the risks involved. A munition's Security Risk Category is determined by
assessing its potential utility, casualty and/or damage effect, adaptability, and portability.
Security Risk Categories are the classification codes the military uses when defining
security requirements for an ammunition shipment. Ammunition is further divided into
12 Security Risk Codes (SRCs) based on whether the item is confidential, secret, or
unclassified. [Ref. 18] Table 2.3 lists the Security Risk Categories and applicable types





CAT I Manportable missiles and rockets in a ready-to-fire configuration (e.g.,
Redeye, Stinger, LAW, etc.) and the explosive rounds for them.
CAT II HE or WP hand or rifle fired grenades, explosives for demolition
operations, and light automatic weapons up to and including .50 caliber
and 40mm machine guns.
CAT III Explosive filled projectiles .50 caliber and larger, weighing 100 pounds
or less, blasting caps, and bulk explosives.
CATIV Non-explosive projectiles weighing 100 pounds or less, riot control
agents, handguns, and materials not included under Categories I through
III above.
Table 2.3. Security Risk Categories [Ref. 18:pp. A-l—A-2].
3. Net Explosive Weight
All ammunition storage and processing facilities have Net Explosive Weight
(NEW) limits specifying the maximum NEW which can be present. Limits are placed on
truck and rail loading, unloading, and storage areas. Limits are placed on piers where
ammunition is loaded and unloaded, which includes the ships being loaded or unloaded.
The NEW for a given list of ammunition is the sum of what are known as the Net
Equivalent Explosive Weights for the individual ammunition items. The net weight of
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explosives for given ammunition items are listed in Tables in both NAVSEA OP-5 and
NAVSEA OP-2165. NEW computations depend on whether the material is at a shore
facility, aboard ship, or aboard cargo ships. For each of these, there are specific rules for
assigning net weights of explosives and the types of NEW there. [Ref. 19]
4. Department of Transportation Classification
The explosive classification system to which commercial transportation providers
are subject is delineated in the Code of Federal Regulations. The Department of
Transportation developed a classification code that incorporates the United Nations
hazard classification system and a compatibility group designation. Compatibility group
letters are used to control transporting and storing explosives and to prevent an increase
in hazard that might result if certain types of explosives were stored or transported
together. The classification code for an explosive consists of the UN division number
followed by the compatibility group letter. [Ref. 20:pp. 415 - 416] Specific
classification codes are listed in Table 2.4.
5. Transportation Protective Services
The degree of security required for shipping sensitive material varies from one
shipment to the next. Transportation Protective Services (TPS) are commercial carrier
services performed to DoD standards that provide physical security while transporting
AA&E. Each level of security is based on the category of material being shipped.
Minimum security requirements for conventional ammunition shipments are listed in
Appendix A and defined below. [Ref. 18:p. x]
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Description of substances or article to be classified Compatibility group Classification code
Primary explosive substance A 1.1A
Article containing a primary explosive substance





Propellant explosive substance or other
Deflagrating explosive substance or article





Secondary detonating explosive substance or
Black powder or article containing a secondary






Article containing a secondary detonating
Explosive substance, without a means of




Article containing a secondary detonating
Explosive substance with its means of






Pyrotechnic substance or article containing
a pyrotechnic substance, or article containing
Both an explosive substance and an illuminating,









Article containing both an explosive substance




Article containing both an explosive substance
And a toxic chemical agent.
K 1.2K
1.3K
Explosive substance or article containing an
Explosive substance and presenting a special




Articles containing only extremely insensitive
Detonating substances.
N 1.6N
Table 2.4. Department of Transportation Classification Codes [Ref. 23: pp. 415-416].
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a. Satellite Motor Surveillance Service (SM)
Satellite Motor Surveillance Service (SM) is a TPS that provides the
Defense Transportation Tracking System (DTTS) with hourly, accurate truck location
reports, two-way communication for reporting in-transit truck status changes, and
emergency situation notification.
b. Dual Driver Protective Service (DD)
Dual Driver Protective Service (DD) is a TPS for Categories III and IV
AA&E that requires a commercial carrier to use two drivers in each vehicle to maintain
constant surveillance.
c. Dual Driver Protective Service with National Agency Check (DN)
Dual Driver (DD) Protective Service with a National Agency Check (DN)
is a TPS for Categories I and II AA&E. It requires a commercial carrier to use two
drivers who have received favorable National Agency Checks. A National Agency
Check is a background investigation by an agency such as the Federal Bureau of
Investigation. The check ensures the individual does not have a history of drug use or
criminal activity.
d. Rail Armed Guard Surveillance Service (RG)
Rail Armed Guard Surveillance Service (RG) is a TPS that provides one
armed guard to maintain constant and specific 24-hour surveillance on specified rail cars.
As an alternative, guard(s) may escort the rail movement in a separate motor vehicle,
providing surveillance is maintained.
21
e. Military Traffic Expediting Service (MTX)
The Association of American Railroads (AAR) provides this service
through its automated communications service network with member railroads. The
AAR is linked to all railroads transporting DoD shipments through the TRAIN II
automated tracking system. The purpose of MTX is to keep Military Traffic
Management Command (MTMC) informed of the status and location of rail cars during
movement from origin to destination. This expediting service is available for single and
joint line movements and is required for sensitive shipments from origin to destination.
/. Rail Inspection Service (RI)
Rail Inspection Service is in-transit inspection, performed by rail carriers
of sensitive and pilferable items. Rail Inspection Service includes MTX service.
Inspection under RI is external only. It assures the integrity of the shipment container or
vehicle and the seals and locking devices securing them. [Ref. 18:pp. x - xiii]
The DoD realized the necessity of providing definitive security provisions for
ammunition shipments. Using government transportation and guard assets was not an
option because of prohibitive costs. Since DoD opted to use commercial transportation
assets for ammunition shipments, they were forced to establish security guidelines that
satisfied military requirements and were within the transportation industry's capabilities.
The DoD adopted existing UN hazard classifications as the basis for identifying the
appropriate level of security required for each shipment and implemented the standards
stated herein.
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6. Department of Defense-Authorized Munitions Carriers
There are currently 17 motor carrier companies and four major railroad
companies that are capable of providing the required security measures for transporting
DoD munitions [Ref. 21,22]. Potential munitions carriers must state an interest in
transporting DoD AA&E and demonstrate the ability to provide the required levels of
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Breakbulk involves moving individual pallets of ammunition and is quite labor
intensive. Moving ammunition in breakbulk is most advantageous when there is low
cargo volume, or insufficient facilities to off-load a container. [Ref. 7:p. 21] The Navy
resupplies its ships using breakbulk shipments from inland ammunition depots to
ammunition ports due to Underway Replenishment (UNREP) restrictions and
containerization efficiency issues. Navy ammunition operations are not easily adaptable
to standard containerization for the complete movement from depot to port. The Navy
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can't UNREP a container, and shipments of munitions from depot to port are small
enough to make it inefficient to containerize them. Underway replenishment involves
transferring cargo from one vessel to another while at sea. Replenishment vessels do not
have adequate space to store containers or the equipment to transfer them to another ship
while underway. Other issues that limit Navy containerization include the time to block
and brace a munitions shipment in a container at the depot only to unload the container at
the port for distribution to ships, 20 ft. container availability, and Container Handling
Equipment (CHE) limitations at the depots. [Ref. 4] The Defense Transportation System
(DTS) relies on commercial industry for technological improvements and methods of
shipping cargo. Breakbulk shipping is no longer economically viable in commercial
shipping operations since the development and wide-spread use of containers and
container ships. [Ref. 7:p. 21]
8. Containerized Cargo
"Containerization is a method of distributing merchandise in a unitized form
thereby permitting an intermodal transport system to be developed providing a possible
combination of rail, road, canal and maritime transport" [Ref. 23 :p. 368].
Containerization is also defined as "using box-like devices to store, protect and handle a
number of packages as a unit of transit, [utilizing a] shipping system based on large
cargo-carrying containers that can be interchanged between trucks, trains and ships
without rehandling contents" [Ref. 24:p. 256]. The preferred method of moving
ammunition is in containers because of the efficiencies in handling and storage that
containers provide. Containerization reduces delivery times of resupply by reducing
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handling, loading, and unloading times. Containerization is an efficient way to move
large volumes of munitions when compared to breakbulk. However, the equipment
required to move, store, and load many pallets containerized as a single unit load is
capital intensive. [Ref. 7:pp. 20-21] The DoD is improving its container handling
infrastructure through the recent purchase of a gantry crane for each of the West Coast
ammunition ports and one commercial lift truck for each of the Tier I and II depots [Ref.
25].
C. MUNITIONS MOVEMENT REQUIREMENTS
1. Peacetime
On average, 76 percent of the total weight of Department of Defense ammunition
is transported by motor carrier (truck) and 24 percent by rail (see Appendix B for
computations). The goal of the Department of Defense is to increasingly containerize its
ammunition and change the transportation ratio to 90 percent rail and 10 percent truck.
[Ref. 23] Table 2.5 lists the number of shipments, by mode, from the eight Tier I and II
ammunition depots to the three DoD ammunition ports. Data for truck movement of
ammunition was obtained from the Defense Transportation Tracking System; the number
of rail movements was approximated using a 76 percent truck, 24 percent rail ratio.
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^ 1998 data only includes shipments through June.
Table 2.5. Ammunition Shipments by Transportation Mode [Ref. 26].
2. Mobilization
The Mobility Requirements Study (MRS) of 1992 and the Mobility Requirements
Study Bottom Up Review Update (MRS BURU) of 1995 specified transportation
requirements for mobilization in response to a Major Regional Contingency (MRC).
MRS BURU requires shipping 924,000 tons of munitions from the eight Tier I and II
depots to the three DoD ammunition ports in 16 weeks. MRS BURU assumes maximum
containerization implying approximately 90 percent of all ammunition is shipped in 20-
foot containers; the remaining ten percent is shipped as breakbulk. This assumption is
based on current trends in the commercial sector toward increased containerization. The
breakbulk requirement includes Navy ammunition, sustainment ammunition being
shipped by air, and the Army ammunition basic load that is not included in the MRS-
BURU requirements. The DoD goal is that 90 percent of the total weight of munitions
transported will be by rail and ten percent by truck. Truck transportation usage is
assumed to encompass the Navy's breakbulk requirement for ammunition resupply.
[Ref. 22]
During Desert Shield/Desert Storm, 477,000 tons were moved from 21 depots to
three ports. Ninety-five percent of the ammunition was shipped breakbulk and required
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5500 trucks and 5650 railcars over 32 weeks. [Ref. 22] MRS BURU requires 46 percent
more ammunition to be shipped from depot to port in half the time required for Desert
Shield/Desert Storm. If the total weight was transported entirely by truck, it would
require 41,067 trucks. If the total weight was transported entirely in rail boxcars it would
require 18,480 boxcars. If transported entirely containerized it would require 66,475
TEU containers. Basing transportation requirements on the Department of Defense's
goal of 90 percent rail, ten percent truck produces a requirement for 29,914 railcars, and
4,107 trucks over 16 weeks (Appendix B).
D. AMMUNITION TRANSPORTATION RELATED EXERCISES
DoD incorporated lessons learned about efficiently transporting ammunition
during Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm as recommendations in the Mobility
Requirements Study (MRS) of 1992. The attention the MRS gave to ammunition
prompted the United States Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) to develop
exercises to test and develop the intermodal ammunition transportation. In order to more
accurately assess ordnance requirements and the logistics process involved during
mobilization for a MRC, the Joint Ordnance Wargame was developed. Exercises and
wargames provide a tool for identifying issues and shortfalls affecting ammunition
transportation before an actual requirement exists.
1. TURBOCADS
The United States Transportation Command realized that the uniqueness of
ammunition presented a number of obstacles to effectively using intermodal
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transportation and developed a series of exercises to address and study ammunition
transportation. These exercises, called TURBOCADS (Containerized Ammunition
Delivery System), were designed to stress CADS capabilities and to assess commercial
industry's ability to support containerized munitions transportation requirements. [Ref.
11]
TURBOCADS exercises identify potential shortfalls in the transportation system
that could prevent the routine continuous use of containerized muntions. TURBOCADS
exercises test on-hand container handling equipment throughput at depots and ports and
identify container-handling shortages. They also test container throughput at ammunition
ports. They found a shortage of CHE at depots and ports and that borrowing or leasing
equipment is standard practice at installations with shortages. This presented an obstacle
in the smooth operation of containerized ammunition transfer. Another major finding
was the low container throughput at the West Coast ammunition ports. Dedicated
container cranes did not exist at these ports and throughput suffered as a result. Each
year, a subsequent TURBOCADS exercise is designed to improve lessons learned from
the previous exercise and test a different area of the containerized ammunition pipeline.
[Ref. 7:p. 77]
2. JORDWAR
The Joint Ordnance Wargame (JORDWAR) is a munitions-based, joint logistics
wargame. It evaluates near-term ammunition logistics, identifies challenges in material,
transportation, and facilities, and develops recommendations to improve ammunition
logistics from origin to destination. The Joint Ordnance Wargame 1997 was conducted at
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the Naval War College. It utilized a dual MRC scenario based on current CINCs
Operations Plans (OPLANS) to generate data and analysis. [Ref. 27]
Ammunition transportation infrastructure capabilities are tested during
JORDWAR. More specifically, container availability and size, Material Handling
Equipment (MHE), Container Handling Equipment (CHE), and mode assets are tested to
identify potential problems. The wargame found that, with minor modifications, an
adequate number of ammunition grade commercial 20-foot ISO containers exist to handle
surge requirements. Commercially leased containers require the addition of two door
post retainer bars to be suitable for ammunition shipments. A related issue is whether to
use 40-foot containers for munitions; commercial industry is moving to that standard
size. However, with the density of ammunition, an average load weighs out in a 20-foot
container before it cubes out. Furthermore, military CHE, already in short supply, is
designed to handle 20-foot containers. Therefore, it would not be practical, or efficient,
to use 40-foot containers for muntions. The wargame found that shortages in MHE and
CHE negatively affects throughput at depots and ports. Rail and trucking industry trends
also impede the flow of munitions. [Ref. 22] Specific industry trends will be discussed
in more detail in Chapter III.
E. CONCLUSION
Ammunition is the primary means by which military objectives are achieved.
There is necessarily a multi-faceted collection of organizations within DoD managing
ammunition to ensure it is available in sufficient quantities to meet the warfighter's
needs. Munitions require a large transportation infrastructure. Historical data of
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peacetime shipments reveal current shipment trends while MRS BURU identified DoD
goals for shipping ammunition during mobilization. Department of Defense goals are
based on transportation industry trends that would yield maximum efficiency and
effectiveness in ammunition transportation. Analysizing modal characteristics is
warranted to assess the feasibility of DoD' s goals.
The next chapter identifies the primary modal characteristics and their differences
as they affect munitions transportation. Equipment capabilities and limitations,
availability, accessibility to ammunition installations, and other issues affecting carrier
performance will be presented.
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III. TRANSPORTATION INDUSTRY CAPABILITIES
A. INTRODUCTION
It is important to know types of equipment, weight limitations, equipment
availability, and modal access to ammunition installations, as well as other factors that
could affect the ultimate performance of a munitions carrier. When making the decision
about which mode of transportation is most appropriate for a particular shipment, each
mode has different characteristics. This chapter analyzes each of these factors for rail
and motor carrier transportation to identify the information necessary to make modal
decisions.
B. RAIL
1. Cargo Weight Limitations
The Army's Industrial Operations Command indicates the weight limitation for
boxcars used for breakbulk shipments of ammunition is 100,000 pounds [Ref. 28]. The
weight limitation used by MTMC's Operations and Plans Office for determining 20-foot
intermodal container requirements is 27,800 pounds [Ref. 22]. These limitations are
important when determining mode of transportation and whether to ship using a boxcar
or container. There are many other factors to consider when making the decision whether
to use rail or truck, boxcar or container but with all other factors being equal the mode
with the greater capacity would be preferable. A goal is to minimize material handling in
order to minimize the costs associated with it.
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2. Security
Another important consideration in mode selection is the security each mode is
capable of providing. Depending on the shipment's Security Risk Category (SRC),
security may be a deciding factor in mode selection. The rail industry can provide Rail
Armed Guard Surveillance Service, Military Traffic Expediting Service, and Rail
Inspection Service as discussed in Chapter II. Security Risk Category I material is the
only category that requires an armed guard; SRC U, III and IV material only requires
inspection service. For SRC I material, the armed guards are not located in or on the
railcar in which the ammunition is shipped. The only way an armed guard can maintain
positive visual surveillance of the railcar is if it is located adjacent to the locomotive or at
the end of a train using a caboose. Military Traffic Expediting Service is required for all
rail ammunition shipments.
3. Equipment
Rail equipment used for shipping ammunition includes boxcars (see Figure 3.1),
containers and railcars capable of carrying 20-foot containers, often called intermodal
cars. Boxcars are used for breakbulk ammunition shipment while containers are used
when the ultimate destination is outside the Continental United States (OCONUS) and
could require transfer aboard a vessel for shipment overseas.
There are various types of intermodal cars, including 60-foot flatcars, 89-foot
flatcars, articulated spine cars, and double-stack well cars. DoD prefers single deck, 60
and 89-foot flatcars because they can be used for either unit equipment or Container on
Flatcar (COFC) shipments. The 60-foot flatcars are capable of handling three 20-foot
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containers. The 89-foot flatcars are capable of handling four 20-foot containers. In the
1970's, the conventional 89-foot flatcar was the industry standard, but commercially-held
inventories of 89-foot flatcars are dwindling. Railroads have been getting rid of these
flatcars because of their low commercial demand. Many commercially-held 89-foot
single deck COFC cars are being converted to bi-level automobile railcars [Ref. 3]
Figure 3.1. Boxcar.
Spine cars are lightweight to improve fuel efficiency, designed to provide
damage-free ride characteristics and can carry five containers. Double-stack cars refer to
containers moving on equipment that can be loaded with one container placed on top of
another. A common configuration is five-unit articulated double-stack cars capable of
carrying ten 40-foot containers, although 20-foot containers are not carried in the top
position of a double stack car. [Ref. 24] (See Figure 3.2)
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Figure 3.2. Double-stack Railcar.
Several different 20-foot containers are used to transport ammunition. Some of
the most common include Ammunition Restraint Military Van (MILVAN) end- opening
containers, commercial International Standards Organization (ISO) end-opening
containers, and side-opening containers. End-opening units are the most common
intermodal containers in the inventory. The large majority only open at one end, but
some double end-opening containers exist. Other less common containers or container
loading equipment include the 20-foot half-height container, 20-foot flatrack, load and
roll pallet (LRP), and container roll-on/off platform (CROP). [Ref. 29:pp. 11-7—11-21]
The end-opening container will probably be the Department of Defense's predominate
container system. It is currently the commercial shipping industry standard (Twenty-foot
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Equivalent Unit) and is familiar to DoD personnel who work with handling and
stuffing/unstuffing containers. [Ref. 7:p. 31] (See Figure 3.3)
Figure 3.3. End-opening Container [Ref. 29:p. II-8].
The Ammunition Restraint MILVAN is made of steel with wood floors and walls.
It has an internal restraint system of eight slotted steel rails permanently installed on each
sidewall with 25 adjustable crossbars that can be inserted into the slots. Forklift pockets
are placed along the bottom for easy Container Handling Equipment (CHE) access. [Ref.
29:p. n-7]
Commercial 20-foot containers can be used to transport ammunition as long as
their door-end corner posts have been modified with angle irons to enhance blocking and
bracing of ammunition loads. Since there is no permanent restraint system, as in the
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MBLVAN, wooden blocking and bracing is used to restrain munitions. These containers
have standard handling fittings on the top of the container as well as forklift pockets
along the bottom. [Ref. 29:p. II-7]
A Load and Roll Pallet (LRP) is a steel frame designed to fit inside a standard
ISO container. It has rollers on one end so the load can be rolled in and out of a container
by lifting the non-roller end of the pallet with a forklift or winch. This system is used
exclusively for transporting missiles, including four Multiple Launch Rocket System
(MLRS) pods or four Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) pods. The MTMC
controls approximately 500 LRP units in the DoD inventory. [Ref. 7:p. 34] (See Figure
3.4)
Figure 3.4. Load and Roll Pallet Assembly [Ref. 29:p. 11-21].
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The Container Roll-On/Off Platform (CROP) is a piece of handling equipment
that fits inside a standard ISO container. It has a rolling mechanism that provides for
easy loading and unloading. It has locking mechanisms in the front and rear that self-
lock when the platform is loaded. The CROP is conceptually similar to the LRP; the
LRP is specialized for missiles while the CROP is designed to accommodate a variety of
commodities, including most types of ammunition. [Ref. 7:p. 37]
Side-opening containers are ISO containers with two double doors located on one
side that allow easy access to the container's contents. These containers are fitted
internal tie down points for securing ammunition. It is easy for almost any forklift to
reach the cargo, so this container is used successfully with many different sizes and types
of ammunition. [Ref. 29:p. II- 11] (See Figure 3.5)
Figure 3.5. Side-opening Container [Ref. 29:p. 11-12].
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Half-height containers have the footprint of a normal 20-foot container, but are
half the height. It has standard structural members and corner fittings, an open top and
one drop-end opening. Contents are easily accessible by Materials Handling Equipment
(MHE) or crane. Although it does not have a top, contents are protected from the
elements by tarpaulins during shipment and storage. They are useful for transporting
very dense ammunition with small vertical dimensions. However, they are not very
useful for ammunition requiring higher security levels. [Ref. 29:p. 11-11] (See Figure
3.6)
Figure 3.6. Half-height Container [Ref. 29:p. 11-15].
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A flatrack is a shipping platform with no top or sides; it may or may not have end-
walls. Flatracks are used to transport high cube munitions, that are slightly larger than
the eight-foot high by eight-foot wide dimensions of a standard ISO container, and have
container handling fittings and forklift pockets. Because of its obvious lack of security, it
is the least desirable type of container to transport ammunition. [Ref. 7:p 34] (See
Figure 3.7)
Figure 3.7. Flatracks [Ref. 29:p. 11-20].
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There are numerous types and variations of MHE and CHE used by ammunition
depots and ports. Some of the more common types include forklifts, Rough Terrain
Container Handlers (RTCH) with Top Handlers, and Rough Terrain Container Cranes.
The forklift, or lift truck, is considered the "workhorse" of MHE. Forklifts can be
battery powered or powered by an internal combustion engine using gasoline, propane, or
diesel fuel. Using a counterbalance, forklifts can carry up to 100,000 pounds and handle
height capacities up to 30 feet. The main advantage of forklifts is their flexibility and
relatively low cost, approximately $30,000 per forklift. [Ref. 30:p. 206] Forklifts can be
used to load and unload railcars and containers of virtually any dimensions.
The Rough Terrain Container Handler (RTCH) with top handler can both lift
individual 20-foot, 35-foot, or 40-foot ISO containers with gross weights up to 50,000
pounds and carry them over improved or unimproved terrain such as soft soil and
beaches. A special fork kit is also available to lift 20-foot half-height containers,
flatracks, and containers with fork pockets as the only available lift fixture. The RTCH is
a four-wheel drive vehicle capable of fording up to five feet of water. The RTCH
provides extensive flexibility for container handling in the field. [Ref. 29:p. 11-22] This
equipment, however, is not capable of loading containers of any length into the "well" of
intermodal railcars. It is limited to loading and unloading single deck railcars [Ref. 25].
(See Figure 3.8)
The Rough Terrain Container Crane (RTCC) is a wheel-mounted crane capable of
lifting a fully loaded 20 or 40-foot ISO container. This equipment can be used to
augment the RTCH in transferring containers and other cargo between transportation
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modes and storage areas. The RTCC can be operated on hard surfaces or on soft surfaces
with wooden platform sections to support the weight. [Ref. 29:p. 11-22] (See Figure 3.9)
Figure 3.8. Rough Terrain Container Handler and Top Handler [Ref. 29:p. 11-25].
There are standards and inspection criteria for boxcars, containers and intermodal
cars. Twenty-foot containers that meet the physical inspection criteria can be used to
transport munitions. The physical inspection criteria for boxcars includes suitability of
the cargo space for loading and railcar mechanical condition, and contamination. The
cargo space must be clean, have no protruding nails, screws, or bolts, and all debris and
dunnage must be removed. The floors, walls, and roof must be free of holes, cracks,
loose boards, decayed spots, and any combustible or corrosive liquid or solid. Also, the
railcar cannot have any exposed metal floor plates. [Ref. 16:p. 3-3]
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Figure 3.9. Rough Terrain Container Crane [Ref. 29:p. 11-23].
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The physical inspection criteria for containers include the following items. The
doors, weather seals, hinges, and latches must be free from damage and wear. The roof,
sides, ends and doors must be free from holes, tears, rusted thin spots, and punctures.
There can not be any missing, cracked, or broken welds at the juncture between any
primary structural components. Also, the floor must be free of holes and warped or
damaged floorboards. [Ref. 16:p. 4-1—4-2] Before a container can be used it must be
free of any residue of previous cargo and its interior walls and floor must be free from
protrusions. If a container has any safety-related deficiency or damage that could place
any person in danger, it can not be used. [Ref. 31:p. 32]
In theory, all single deck and the "wells" of all double stack intermodal cars can
be used for ammunition. If a boxcar has a steel floor or spark shields and meets the
physical inspection criteria it can be used to ship ammunition [Ref. 25].
4. Twenty-foot Container and Railcar Availability
The majority of containers in the United States inventory are of the 20- and 40-
foot variety. The inventory of each type is continuing to grow, as shown in Table 3.1; the
40-foot inventory is growing much faster than the 20-foot inventory. Commercial
inventories of the 20-foot side opening, flatrack, and half-height containers are shrinking
due to decreased demand. At this time, the 20-foot ISO container is the DoD standard
size for moving ammunition. [Ref. 29:p. II-6]
While it is useful to monitor trends in the quantity of commercial containers, asset
availability is a more important factor. A key factor in determining availability is the
quantity of lessor-owned containers not already under lease to a DoD shipper or ocean
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carrier. This is the additional supply available for lease by the Department of Defense.
This quantity is referred to as the "off-hire rate" and is expressed as a percentage of all
lessor-owned containers. Its value depends largely on the balance of trade. A favorable
balance of trade will increase the demand for containers for overseas shipment,
decreasing the number of off-hire, or available, containers within the United States.
Therefore, worldwide economic conditions dictate the number and location of containers
which are available for DoD use. In recent years, a specific niche has been established
for the standard 20-foot container serving geographic regions with less intense shipping
requirements and lesser-developed infrastructures. The off-hire rate for these niche
commercial assets has generally decreased. [Ref. 29 :p. II-7]
Container Type 1990 Quantity 1994 Quantity Percent Change
20-foot ISO box 833,042 1,304,913 56.6
40-foot ISO box 618,966 1,193,753 92.2
20-foot side-opener 446 85 -80.9
20-foot flatrack 18,728 13,472 -28.1
20-foot half-height 1,193 727 -39.1
Table 3.1. Trends in U.S.-Owned Commercial Container Fleet [Ref. 29:p. II-6]
There are currently 1.44 million 20-foot containers and 1.36 million 40-foot
containers in the U.S. commercial inventory, but rail and vessel fleets are becoming more
frequently designed for 40-foot containers in an effort to increase efficiency and cope
with potential capacity shortages. Only 43 percent of COFC capacity is 20-foot container
compatible and only 23 percent of the slots in the U.S. flag vessel fleet are configured for
20-foot containers. [Ref. 3:p. 23] This portends a longer term potential for reduction of
the percentage of 20-foot containers available. Based on a 1997 DoD survey, conducted
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in conjunction with JORDWAR 97, the available 20-foot containers tend to have a lower
likelihood of meeting ammunition standards as the fleet grows older [Ref. 3:p. F-6].
In response to this trend, approximately 5,000 containers were purchased and
placed in the Containerized Ammunition Distribution System (CADS) fleet. These
containers were distributed between the eight Tier I and n ammunition depots and
reserved for surge capacity in response to a contingency. [Ref. 3:p. DI] JORDWAR 97
concluded that sufficient ammunition-quality commercially-held 20-foot container assets
were available for peacetime and contingency use. The largest concentrations of assets
are in major port areas and can be delivered within one or two days, even with short
notice. [Ref. 3:p. F-4] That ensures that sufficient containers are available when they are
needed, but it doesn't address the problem of transporting those containers.
The Department of Defense policy to use commercial transportation assets to the
maximum extent until they fail to meet shipping requirements results in government-
owned railcars being held in reserve to meet surge requirements; eight percent of
commercial intermodal cars are ammunition capable. This number is based on the ability
to carry 20-foot containers and the ability of DoD CHE to load them. It is difficult for
railroads to identify and locate munitions capable railcars because they are randomly
dispersed throughout the U.S. in daily revenue service. The problem is compounded
because there is no centralized railroad management organization that exists to track this
specific type of railcar. TTX Company, previously Trailer Train, owns and assigns cars
to individual participating companies that manage the assets to meet their own shipping
obligations. To address this problem, DoD recently procured 321 89-foot flatcars to
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prevent surge shortfalls in available equipment. The Department of Defense plans to buy
an additional 349 cars. [Ref. 3:pp. II, F-10]
There are other important industry trends that will affect industry's capability to
support ammunition transportation requirements. First of all, the pool of available
railcars is reduced by the increasing trend to link cars to specific shippers under rail
contracts. According to 1994 data, 69 percent of railroad tonnage is derived from
contracts [Ref. 3:p. 20]. Obviously, other customers cannot lease railcars if they are
already in use.
The supply of RTCH-compatible commercial flatcars is rapidly declining. The
commercial rail fleet of 89-foot single deck COFC cars, compatible with military design
RTCH equipment, is being converted to bi-level automobile railcars. Prior to the
widespread use of double-stack equipment, the 89-foot flatcar was the primary
intermodal car with over 14,000 cars. Table 3.2 shows the trend in number of 89-foot
flatcars.
Date Number of 89-foot flatcars
1 January 1997 4,401
1 January 1998 2,288
1 January 1999 1,000
Table 3.2. Number of 89-foot Flatcars [Ref. 25].
The single deck COFC capacity is being replaced with double-stack well cars.
TTX's four year acquisition plan for intermodal equipment, covering 1998 through 2001,
calls for purchasing 39,131 new platforms, of which 33,284 (approximately 85 percent)
will be double-stack. The remaining 5,847 platforms in the acquisition plan will be
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single-deck three unit all-purpose spine cars capable of carrying 40- to 53-foot containers
or trailers ranging from 28 feet to 53 feet in length. These single deck cars are not
capable of handling 20-foot containers. [Ref. 25] Ninety percent of overall
COFC/TOFC capacity is made up of double-stack cars, which are not compatible with
RTCH equipment. [Ref. 3:p. IV] Current ammunition capable commercial railcars are
restricted to 28,000 20-foot slots because of CHE limitations [Ref. 3:p. F-14]. The
Department of the Army has procured eight commercial lifts, capable of loading well
cars, to be located at each of the Tier I and II ammunition depots to start to address the
issue [Ref. 25]. This action increases the number of 20-foot slots to 1 12,000, which is 31
percent of the commercial fleet [Ref. 3:p. F-14].
Standard 50-foot boxcars are used for non-containerized rail shipments of ammo.
Department of Defense rail fleet plans call for a projected end strength of 888 interchange
certified boxcars for use on depot and to meet navy breakbulk requirements. The
standard U.S. 50-foot boxcar fleet stood at 60,000 on 15 January 1999, with limited
numbers of boxcars being built to meet specific shippers' requirements. As a non-
contract shipper, boxcar as well as other types of rail equipment availability during
peacetime depends on the capacity that contract shippers are not using at any given point
in time. Sufficient boxcars exist in the commercial inventory to support DoD peacetime
breakbulk requirements; the commercial inventory can support surge requirements during
war through the Defense Production Act, if necessary. [Ref. 32]
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5. Access
All ammunition depots have rail access. It is a different story for the ports.
Concord is the only port with commercial rail access. Concord is served by the Union
Pacific Railroad, which passes through the tidal area [Ref. 33 :p. 17]. Military Ocean
Terminal, Sunny Point is served by CSX Railroad through a transfer facility 18 miles
from the terminal; government-owned rail equipment operated by terminal personnel
completes the trip to the port [Ref. 13]. The nearest rail access to Port Hadlock is at
Bangor, approximately 40 miles from the port; a rail/truck container transfer terminal has
been recently constructed in Bangor [Ref. 25].
6. Delays
An issue that can affect railcar availability and transit time is delays. Delays in
service can be caused by a variety of situations and decisions. The rail industry, in its
pure form, is constrained by the rail networks, which reduces its flexibility. This
becomes more of an issue during a contingency surge, but also affects carrier
performance in peacetime. It could ultimately affect the modal decision.
In 1996 and 1997, Union Pacific Railroad experienced delays of more than 30
days due to a combination of railcar, locomotive, and track capacity shortages caused by
poor management choices. Union Pacific closed two of three rail yards in Houston and
then quickly became overwhelmed by the additional traffic through the remaining rail
yard. They were unable to handle the increased demand and this resulted in delays.
Customers started switching to other rail companies and other more expensive forms of
transportation in order to maintain their own level of service. As a result, the other rail
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companies began to experience delays as their systems were strained beyond normal
levels. The brunt of the growing demand fell on trucking firms, which rushed to
purchase new equipment. The trucking companies began to experience driver shortages
as the equipment increased. The railroad and trucking delays also affected the seaports.
Container ships were delayed in offloading, which caused delays in pulling in. The ripple
effect caused by the delays affected customers and consumers alike as prices rose
because of shortages. [Ref. 34]
C. MOTOR CARRIER
1. Cargo Weight Limitations
Different types of truck shipments are broken down by weight. Truckload (TL)
shipments weigh between 40,000 and 45,000 pounds, less-than-truckload (LTL)
shipments weigh between 5,000 and 40,000 pounds, and dromedary shipments weigh less
than 5,000 pounds. [Ref. 28] Dromedary shipments, a subset of LTL shipments, are
small amounts of ammunition packed into individual containers and loaded onto flatbed
trailers. Since each dromedary containers weight limit is 5,000 pounds, LTL shipments
range from one to eight dromedary containers. For all intents and purposes, LTL
shipments do not exist for ammunition shipments, just dromedary shipments.
Department of Transportation regulations limit individual truckloads of arms,
ammunition and explosives to single trailers with a maximum trailer length of 48 feet.
Also, for ammunition shipments, total weight for the tractor, trailer, and cargo together
cannot exceed 80,000 pounds [Ref. 35]. Maximum weight for a truckload of ammunition
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is nearly twice as much as the maximum weight for a 20-foot container. A truckload's
weight capacity is less than half that of a boxcar. The total weight of a shipment would
determine the most efficient choice of mode and subsequent choice of equipment within
that mode. Another consideration that is important when making modal choices is type
of security provided by the carrier.
2. Security
The trucking industry is required to provide satellite tracking and dual driver
protection for ammunition shipments. For the purposes of security requirements, truck
shipments are either TL or LTL; dromedary shipments are included in LTL shipments.
Material in all Security Risk Categories must be trackable by satellite. Security Risk
Category I and II materials require dual drivers that have had national agency checks;
Category III and IV materials require protection by dual drivers, but national agency
checks are not necessary. One driver must be within ten feet of the shipment at all times,
so there is always positive visual surveillance and the shipment is never out of the
drivers' control. Drivers can immediately notify authorities via the Defense
Transportation Tracking System (DTTS) in an emergency.
3. Equipment
The equipment used by the trucking industry to transport munitions includes
tractors, trailers, vans, flatbed trailers and chassis. The type of equipment is determined
by the size of the shipment. The size of a trailer is unimportant as long as it is pulled by a
DTTS equipped tractor. There are currently 1,453 DTTS equipped tractors in the
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trucking industry's inventory [Ref. 21]. The Department of Defense requires straight
frame container chassis with twist-locks for transporting containerized ammunition.
Straight frame chassis make up only 25 percent of the current global inventory; that
percentage is declining as commercial industry is switching to slip frame chassis [Ref.
3:p. 23].
There are physical inspection criteria for motor vehicles, similar to rail. In
general, the suitability of the cargo space for the load, mechanical condition, and driver
suitability is inspected. Specifically, the cargo space must be clean and free of protruding
nails, screws, bolts, or any other object that could damage the load. The floors, walls,
and roof must be free from breaks, tears, and holes. There can not be any oil, gasoline, or
any other combustible or corrosive liquid or solid on the floor, and the tailgates and doors
must be capable of being closed, locked, and sealed. [Ref. 16:p. 2-2]
4. Access
All ammunition depots and ports have truck access. The limiting factor is the
NEW rating of the staging area. A staging area may have an infinite number of slots
filled with a truck, but only if the NEW limit is not exceeded. Conversely, the staging
area may have an infinite number of slots with only one truck if that truck's cargo is at
the NEW limit. The wide variety of ammunition types and load sizes makes it
impractical to establish a NEW limit per vehicle.
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D. CONCLUSION
Many factors affect decisions about the transportation mode for munitions.
Railcar availability, limitations of container handling equipment, the limited numbers of
DTTS tractors, and potential delays in the rail transport system all must be considered.
Several trends within each transportation mode potentially limit availability to DoD in the
future. All these factors create a complicated problem, but DoD can take actions to
maintain the viability of each transportation mode.
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IV. AMMUNITION MOTOR CARRIERS
A. AMMUNITION CARRIER DEMOGRAPHICS
In order to better understand the environment in which munitions motor carriers
operate, a survey was developed. The questions in the survey were designed to provide
information as to the types of firms that provide reliable ammunition transportation. The
DoD's goal of 90 percent rail transportation of ammunition will reduce the number of
shipments carried by motor carriers. This survey was designed to discover the effect this
policy change would have on the motor carrier companies. Issues raised by carriers
during the survey are also discussed. A copy of the Trucking Company Questionnaire is
contained in Appendix C.
1. Survey Questions
Questions #1 and #2 pertain to the amount of time the company has been in
business. These questions ascertained their corporate background. Whether the company
is new to the business or has been transporting munitions for several decades suggests
their commitment to this market segment. Tenure in the munitions transportation
industry could also indicate a company's reliance on revenue generated from DoD
munitions shipments.
Questions #3, #4 and #5 pertain to the revenue generated by each company. The
goal of this question was to determine the amount of their overall business that was DoD
ammunition related. Overall revenue also indicates the company's size. A company with
low overall revenue, compared to other motor carrier companies, and a higher reliance on
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DoD revenue could be more severely affected if DoD shifts to rail shipments. However,
a company with a comparatively high overall revenue and a lower reliance on DoD
revenue would be less affected by the shift to rail.
Questions #6 and #7 pertain to the carriers' participation in intermodal
ammunition shipments. These questions assess current shipment practices to determine
the potential for expanding intermodal shipping in the munitions transportation industry.
These questions focused on truck to rail intermodal transfers.
Question #8 pertains to DTTS equipment availability to determine what fraction
of the total DTTS-equipped tractors the company could provide. There are many factors
to be considered when determining equipment availability, including: equipment
maintenance down time, driver availability, and whether the equipment is being used for
other non-DoD related shipments.
Question #9 pertains to the munitions carriers' contractual obligations during a
contingency surge. This question ascertains if motor carriers have any long-term
contractual agreements with DoD, and if a surge clause is contained in the contract. A
contractual agreement of this kind would indicate a long-term DoD commitment to
munitions motor carriers. It would also indicate the level of planning DoD dedicates to
munitions transportation.
Question #10 pertains to the routes taken by munitions carriers when transporting
sensitive arms, ammunition and explosives. This question determines the degree to
which a company considers the security of an ammunition shipment. A company could
take the minimum required security measures to comply with state and federal
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regulations, or it could take extra steps to exceed minimum standards. The question was
included to provide general information. There are too many factors underlying the
potential responses to this question to make judgements about a company.
Questions #11 and #12 pertain to the carriers' equipment and usage. These
questions, similar to Questions #3, #4, and #5, determine what percentage of the
company's total fleet of equipment was dedicated, or potentially dedicated to ammunition
transportation. The question also indicates the predominant segment of the munitions
transportation market in which the company operates.
2. Survey Methodology
The 17 DoD authorized munitions motor carriers, identified in Chapter n, were
contacted by telephone to conduct the survey. Individuals from four of the companies
requested a faxed questionnaire. Four of the companies initially contacted declined to
participate in the survey, resulting in a 76.5% response rate (13/17).
Not all of the survey questions were answered by all respondents. All
respondents (100%) chose to answer Questions #1, #2, #5, #6, #7, #9, #10 and #11.
Questions #3, #4, #8, and #12 were not answered by all companies. Forty-six percent of
the respondents chose to answer Question #3. The companies that did not respond to
Question #3 indicated that revenue information was proprietary. Sixty-nine percent of




Responses to the survey are summarized in Table 4. 1
.
Question # Demographic Range of Responses
1 Years in Business 12-71 years
2 Years shipping DoD AA&E 5-71 years
3 Overall 1998 Revenue $20,000 - $400,000,000
4 DoD AA&E Percentage of Revenue <l%-90%
8 Equipment Availability 60% -- 100%
11 Number of DTTS Tractors 2-336
11 Total Fleet Size 20 - 3400
11 Satellite Transceiver Equipped Tractors 2 - 3400
12 Percentage of Truckload Shipments 50% -- 100%
Table 4.1. Munitions Motor Carrier Demographic Data.
As noted in the Table, there is wide variability within the carrier group. There
appears to be no correlation between age of a company and the fact that the company
ships ammunition, although seven of thirteen respondents (54%) have been shipping
ammunition for DoD since their business started. The same seven respondents (54%)
indicated that DoD AA&E shipments accounted for over 50 percent of their 1998
revenue. The reported data indicates that as overall revenue increases, percentage of
DoD ammunition-related revenue decreases. This means that more than half of the motor
carrier companies rely on DoD revenue for more than half their annual revenue; as the
percentage of rail ammunition shipments increases, these companies will suffer more
financial damage. Four of seven respondents (57%) that indicated that DoD AA&E
shipments accounted for over 50 percent of their 1998 revenue have also been shipping
DoD AA&E for the longest period of time. There appears to be some correlation
between how long a company has been shipping ammunition and the percentage of
overall revenue that DoD ammunition shipments comprise.
56
There also appears to be correlation between whether a company began by
shipping ammunition or became a munitions carrier at some time after the company's
initial start-up and DoD ammunition-related percentage of overall revenue. This
reinforces the companies' reliance on DoD ammunition shipments and increases the
financial vulnerability of the companies if their market share is decreased by the
increasing use of rail. All companies indicated they do not have long-term contractual
agreements with DoD. This indicates inadequate DoD planning to ensure access to
equipment in time of war. Only one company indicated that its drivers made a conscious
effort to vary the routes they took for consecutive shipments from identical shipment
origins and destinations.
The number of tractors equipped with the Defense Transportation Tracking
System (DTTS) varied widely between the different companies. Numbers ranged from
two to 336 DTTS equipped tractors. Percentage of their total fleet that is DTTS equipped
ranged between two and 100 percent, with an average of 40 percent and a median of 25
percent. There appears to be no correlation between fleet size and number of DTTS
tractors. Six of 13 respondents (46%) indicated that 100 percent of their fleet was
equipped with satellite transceivers; other responses ranged from two to 87 percent.
Nine of 13 companies (69%) answered the question pertaining to the percentage
of truckload and dromedary (less-than-truckload) shipments carried by their company.
Four companies (31%) indicated that they only carry truckload shipments. Truckload
shipments ranged from 50 to 80 percent of total shipments for the remaining five
companies. All respondents indicated that at least half of their shipments were truckload;
the remaining shipments were dromedary.
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C. ISSUES
There are a number of issues that have the potential of affecting the future
viability of motor carrier ammunition transportation. These issues, if not addressed by
DoD, could inhibit several munitions carriers from providing transportation assets to the
military in a consistent, reliable manner.
1. Empty Backhaul Shipments
Current practices do not permit an inbound munitions carrier to carry an outbound
cargo shipment of any kind, unless the carrier is rated as the lowest cost carrier for the
outbound movement [Ref. 36]. This practice increases the carriers' operating costs, and
ultimately the DoD's costs, as carriers must charge higher rates to offset the revenue lost
by not carrying cargo on return trips. This practice also reduces carrier availability
during its return trip.
Current practices regarding ammunition shipment promote inefficiency. Empty
outbound carriers is not the most efficient way to transport munitions. A system which
maximizes carrier equipment utilization for the inbound and outbound shipment leg
would benefit both the carrier and DoD. The carrier would generate revenue for both
shipment legs and DoD could receive decreased service rates.
2. Limited Operating Hours at Ammunition Facilities
The logistics industry operates seven days a week, 24 hours per day. However,
ammunition installations currently only work four days per week. This is only 19 percent
of the time the logistics industry is operating; an 81 percent reduction in the time
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available to make deliveries. Trucking companies use two types of drivers to transport
munitions, owner-operators and company employees. The majority of driver teams and
tractors used to transport munitions are owner-operators [Ref. 37]. These are
independent contractors who lease their services and equipment to the motor carrier.
Owner-operators must maximize their miles driven because that is their only form of
compensation. Any time they are delayed, their revenue is reduced. In addition,
regardless of the type of driver used, trucking companies do not make money while their
equipment sits idle waiting to unload at ammunition installations.
3. Rates
There is a disparity between the rates motor carriers want to charge for
ammunition shipments and the rates DoD is willing to pay. The focus within DoD is to
find the lowest cost service. Ammunition transportation is a specialized service provided
by only a few motor carriers. There are several requirements for munitions carriers that
don't apply to general commodity shippers, all of which increase the munitions carriers'
costs. The liability insurance requirement for munitions carriers is approximately double
that required for general cargo carriers. As well, munitions carriers must provide dual
drivers for each shipment. This requirement means that an additional driver is used for
each ammunition shipment; this driver could otherwise be used for revenue producing
shipments. Munitions drivers also require special training. National agency checks,
when required, are a further expense. The equipment required for satellite tracking costs
approximately $5,000 per transceiver. A "panic" button must also be installed, at
additional cost, to make the satellite transceiver DTTS compatible.
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Receiving payment from DoD is also difficult. One carrier indicated it shipped
nine loads of ammunition for DoD in June 1998; as of February 1999 it hadn't received
payment for its services.
There are trends within the ammunition transportation market that affect, or
should affect rates. Ammunition shipments are diminishing due to the redeployment of
forces from Europe and increasing simulated weapons training. The planned shift from
motor carriers to rail for ammunition movement further reduces motor carrier shipments.
Increasing ammunition containerization also reduces the number of shipments available
for motor carriers; the majority of motor carriers use 48-foot enclosed trailers rather than
flatbeds. These factors indicate decreasing demand for motor carrier ammunition
shipments. The rules of supply and demand indicate that price decreases as demand
decreases; the quantity suppliers are willing to supply at the lower price also decreases.
DoD is trying to address two different markets: peacetime ammunition
transportation and mobilization ammunition transportation. Over half of the trucking
companies indicated that they relied on peacetime DoD munitions shipments for more
than half of their revenue. If DoD awards tenders to the lowest cost bidder, then those
carriers that cannot offer lower rates and maintain the same level of service will be forced
to leave the market. The demand for transportation in the mobilization market is much
higher than the demand for transportation in the peacetime market. DoD wants munitions
carriers to supply sufficient transportation for the mobilization market while paying rates
determined in the peacetime market. This issue is aggravated by empty backhaul
shipments. Munitions carriers indicate they would be willing to supply transportation at a
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level determined in the mobilization market if supported by demand or prices in the
peacetime market.
D. CONCLUSION
None of the trucking companies indicated that DoD shipments comprised 100
percent of their annual revenue for 1998. Through their decisions to not rely entirely on
DoD shipments, trucking companies have implied that to do so would not be wise
business practice. The percentage of DTTS tractors to total fleet also indicates a
reluctance to rely upon the munitions transportation niche market. There are a number of
issues that create inefficiencies within the munitions transportation market. The
percentage of trucking companies' overall revenue that is comprised of DoD munitions
shipments will decrease if the inefficiencies are not addressed. The number of
transportation assets available to DoD will decrease during peacetime and sufficient
equipment will not be available in the event of a contingency.
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V. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The final chapter of this thesis provides a summary, conclusions and
recommendations based on this analysis of the ammunition transportation industry.
Additionally, further research questions are proposed pertaining to efficient and reliable
ammunition transportation.
A. SUMMARY
This research has shown that the DoD peacetime conventional ammunition
transportation modal combination is, on average, 76 percent motor carrier and 24 percent
rail. The DoD's goal for mobilization, as stated in the MRS, is maximum
containerization of ammunition transported 90 percent by rail and 10 percent by motor
carrier. There is a distinct difference between the two situations. Ammunition shipments
during mobilization are characterized by high-volume over a short period of time;
peacetime shipments are characterized by lower volume over a longer period of time. To
design or plan a transportation system for mobilization while not changing operating
procedures during peacetime is inefficient.
The two main factors affecting the ultimate modal combination decision include
CHE limitations and the inefficiencies involved with motor carrier transportation. While
each of these factors has important implications in wartime scenarios, during peacetime
operations there is no mandated ideal modal combination. It is up to the shipper's
discretion as to which mode of transportation is best suited for each separate shipment.
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B. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
1. Conclusion: Container Handling Equipment limits the types of
railcars available for using 20-foot containers.
Container Handling Equipment, and the Rough Terrain Container Handlers
(RTCH) in particular, have been the limiting factor in railcar availability. The RTCH
have been reliable and quite capable of loading and unloading containers from single
deck flatcars. Unfortunately, single deck flatcars are becoming more and more scarce in
railcar fleets due to a lack of general consumer demand. Due to its inability to load and
unload "well" cars, the RTCH severely limits the number of railcar slots capable of
shipping 20-foot containers. With the commercial sector trend toward double-stack well
cars, the usefulness of the RTCH in CONUS is waning.
Recommendation: Replace all Rough Terrain Container Handlers in
CONUS with Commercial CHE.
Ninety-percent of new intermodal railcars are not RTCH compatible. Replacing
the CHE now will not affect the ability to load single deck flatcars but will significantly
expand the number of railcars available for munitions transportation.
2. Conclusion: Forty-foot containers can be used for ammunition
transportation.
Within the commercial intermodal industry, the 40-foot container is replacing the
20-foot container as the industry standard. Railcars are no longer specifically designed to
accommodate 20-foot containers, and a small number of slots are dedicated to 20-foot
containers aboard commercial vessels. A typical 20-foot container load of ammunition
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will weigh-out before all available space is utilized due to the density of ammunition.
Therefore, the additional size of a 40-foot container would not be efficiently utilized.
While it is inefficient to use 40-foot containers on an on-going basis, when 20-foot
container availability is constrained, during mobilization for example, they are an
acceptable substitute.
Recommedation: Change DoD policy to allow the use of 40-foot containers
on an as-needed basis.
Utilizing 40-foot containers will expand the pool of containers available for
munitions transportation during a mobilization surge.
3. Conclusion: There is no DoD program to ensure access to motor
carrier equipment in time of war.
The DoD desires assured access to truck equipment in time of war but has not
developed a partnership with munitions motor carriers during peacetime that indicates
commitment to future availability. Issues that affect equipment availability include lack
of backhaul shipments, limited operating hours at ammunition installations, and DoD's
policy of obtaining lowest-cost transportation services. Under these conditions, new
entrants into the munitions carriers market are unlikely; many of the current carriers may
leave the market if conditions do not improve. The DoD must establish a long-term
program with existing munitions carriers to encourage doing business with DoD.
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Recommendation: Develop a long-term incentive program for munitions
motor carriers.
Existing programs such as the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) and Voluntary
Intermodal Sealift Agreement (VISA) guarantee access to transportation assets in the
time of war. A similar program could be established for CONUS ammunition
transportation.
4. Conclusion: Infrastructure and throughput improvements have been
directly related to rail and containerization.
All infrastructure improvements made since Desert Shield/Desert Storm have
been in the area of containerization and rail throughput. The planning assumption is that
containerized ammunition will be transported by rail. Evidence, DoD has purchased 321
89-foot flatcars and 5,000 CADS containers. However, there has not been any
investment in motor carrier infrastructure or capacity improvement. Motor carrier
capacity will not be there when needed for mobilization if it is not maintained during
peacetime. If, in time of war, the rail capacity is nonexistent, there needs to be a backup
plan.
Recommendation: Department of Defense should enter into long-term
contractual agreements with qualified munitions motor carrier companies to
insure the necessary transportation capacity exists in wartime.
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C. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY
1. What would the affect of delays in the railroad network be on railcar
availability during mobilization?
2. Given that the commercial sector emphasizes intermodal movements, what is
the feasibility of utilizing existing intermodal networks for ammunition
transportation?
3. What long-term contractual agreements with motor carriers would ensure
throughput availability for DoD needs?
4. Should DoD purchase truck container chassis and prestage them at
ammunition depots, similar to CADS containers, to alleviate truck equipment
shortages during surge conditions?
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APPENDIX B. TRANSPORTATION ASSET REQUIREMENT CALCULATIONS
The following data and calculations clarify the transportation asset requirements
for peacetime and mobilization. Table B.l presents total per month motor carrier
munitions shipments from the eight Tier I and II ammunition depots to the three DoD
ammunition ports.
Table B.l. Depot Shipment Summary.
Date
Yearly
Anniston Blueqrass Crane Hawthorne Letterkenny McAlester Red River Tooele Total Total
Jan-95 3 8 7 6 24
Feb-95 3 29 2 12 2 1 1 50
Mar-95 7 4 45 11 2 27 17 113
Apr-95 9 4 13 22 5 5 13 4 75
May-95 11 14 46 16 79 28 4 1 199
Jun-95 17 7 40 42 8 21 4 4 143
Jul-95 9 88 87 26 3 7 3 12 235
Aug-95 1 2 7 8 12 1 8 8 47
Sep-95 46 2 15 32 12 36 17 5 165
Oct-95 6 7 33 9 4 10 1 3 73
Nov-95 18 24 66 9 5 56 35 3 216
Dec-95 7 2 4 2 2 2 4 9 32 1372
Jan-96 2 2 35 2 2 1 1 45
Feb-96 4 13 32 12 3 68 13 1 146
Mar-96 38 7 15 19 9 88
Apr-96 4 4 33 24 3 24 2 6 100
May-96 4 7 15 36 18 21 4 5 110
Jun-96 3 9 1 18 7 38
Jul-96 20 2 10 14 14 10 26 14 110
Aug-96 38 1 9 6 2 24 10 9 99
Sep-96 18 10 31 6 10 31 2 3 111
Oct-96 9 11 42 20 8 36 13 5 144
Nov-96 13 8 31 6 1 2 3 64
Dec-96 33 1 65 15 4 3 3 124 1179
Jan-97 4 18 36 60 16 107 23 18 282
Feb-97 6 6 21 9 11 61 1 115
Mar-97 1 2 29 11 2 25 3 4 77
Apr-97 15 41 21 23 38 26 21 10 195
May-97 9 10 28 10 3 16 14 4 94
Jun-97 2 27 23 1 15 2 16 86
Jul-97 2 9 64 31 16 13 34 169
Aug-97 23 33 37 14 15 18 2 3 145
Sep-97 16 2 46 28 33 31 40 12 208
Oct-97 15 8 25 1 1 33 8 91
Nov-97 2 34 37 1 7 34 41 1 157
Dec-97 6 4 76 14 12 24 30 8 174 1793
Jan-98 6 2 45 21 16 58 7 5 160
Feb-98 7 2 2 11 4 2 28
Mar-98 20 22 81 38 8 10 4 183
Apr-98 9 7 96 15 20 30 6 9 192
May-98 2 45 6 1 12 9 75
Jun-98 57 1 27 7 3 20 1 3 119 757
Totals 482 412 1447 690 435 997 422 216 5101 5101
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The following Table contains total amounts of DoD ammunition shipped per year
by mode and weight.
Table B.2. DoD Peacetime
Truck
Shipments By Mode and Weight.
Rail % of Total







































Aver. 673,081,516 228,720,794 901,802,310 76% 24%
Data was obtained from Government Bill of Lading information contained in the
CONUS Freight Management (CFM) program. 1995 and 1996 data were considered
unreliable as a result of a major system changeover at Defense Finance and Accounting
System (DFAS) [Ref. 28].
Twenty-foot Equivalent Unit (TEU) computations assume, per MTMC's
Operations and Plans Office, that 13.9 Short Tons is the weight limit for 20-foot
containers [Ref. 22]. Computations to determine the required number of trucks assume,
per Industrial Operations Command, that each truck carries 45,000 pounds [Ref. 29].
Computations to determine the required number of boxcars assume that each car carries
100,000 pounds [Ref. 29]. Percentage of total for each transportation mode was
determined by dividing the weight shipped by truck or rail during a particular year by the
total weight shipped during that year. Examples of each computation from 1992 are:
-859,669,520 pounds/27,800 poundsATEU = 30,923 TEU
-859,669,520 pounds/45,000 pounds/truck = 19,104 trucks
-332,727,487 pounds/100,000 pounds/railcar = 3,327 railcars
-332,727,487 pounds shipped by rail/1,192,397,007 total pounds x 100 = 28%
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The average percentage of total by mode was applied to the trucking shipment
data from the ammunition depots to the ports to determine an approximate number of rail
shipments for a given year. For example, in 1995 there were 1372 ammunition shipments
by truck with 45,000 pounds per truck, which equals 61,740,000 pounds shipped by
truck. On average, 76 percent of the total weight shipped for any year is shipped by
truck, so 61,740,000 pounds/.76 = 81,236,842 pounds total. Of that total, 24 percent of
the shipments were made by rail, so 81,236,842 pounds x .24 = 19,496,842 pounds
shipped by rail with 100,000 pounds per railcar equals 195 rail shipments.
The following Table represents the amount of ammunition required for a MRC, as
set in the MRS BURU. It is assumed that a ton equals 2,000 pounds. The numbers of
trucks, railcars, and TEU are based on the entire amount of ammunition being shipped by
that mode.

















Table B.4 represents the number of TEU, trucks, and railcar equivalent units
based on the DoD goals of maximum containerization and 90 percent of total shipped by
rail and 10 percent shipped by truck. Railcar platform numbers are based on the
intermodal transportation planning standard of one 40 foot or two 20-foot containers per
platform [Ref. 22].
Table B.4. DoD requirements using 90% rail and 10% truck.
10% Truck TEU Trucks 90% Rail TEU
Railcar
Platforms
184,800,000 6,647 4,107 1,663,200,000 59,827 29,914
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Table B.5 represents the transportation assets required to transport the MRS
BURU ammunition weight requirement using the current modal ratio of 76 percent truck
and 24 percent rail.
Table B.5. DoD requirements using 24% rail and 76% truck.
76% Truck TEU Trucks 24% Rail TEU
Railcar
Platforms
1,404,480,000 50,521 31,211 443,520,000 15,954 7,977
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APPENDIX C. TRUCKING COMPANY QUESTIONNAIRE
1
.
How long have you been in business?
2. How long have you been shipping arms, ammunition and explosives for the
Department of Defense?
3. What was your revenue for 1998?
4. What percentage of your overall revenue was Department of Defense arms,
ammunition or explosives related?
5. What percentage of your overall shipments were Department of Defense arms,
ammunition or explosives?
6. Do you participate in intermodal shipments of Department of Defense arms,
ammunition or explosives?
7. If yes, with whom and what network?
8. At this moment, how many DTTS tractors are in use shipping Department of Defense
arms, ammunition, or explosives, and how many are available for use?
9. How much arms, ammunition, or explosives or how many trucks in what period of
time are you contracted to provide during a deployment for a contingency or MRC?
10. When transporting sensitive arms, ammunition, and explosives, do you follow the
same routes from identical origins and destinations or do you vary them?
11. How many DTTS equipped tractors do you have? What is your total fleet size? How
many of your total are satellite transceiver equipped?
12. What percentage of your shipments of arms, ammunition, and explosives are Truck-
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